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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Jacob Stephen Davis appeals from his convictions for two counts of lewd 
conduct, two counts of sexual battery of a minor and one count of possession of 
sexually exploitative materials and his sentence for a sex offender registry 
violation. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Davis in one case with failing to change the address of 
his sex offender registration and an enhancement for being a persistent violator 
(R., pp. 82-85) and in another case a grand jury indicted him for four counts of 
lewd conduct with a child, four counts of sexual battery of a minor, seven counts 
of possession of sexually exploitative material, and an enhancement for being a 
repeat sexual offender (R., pp. 304-11).  The cases proceeded to separate jury 
trials.  (R., pp. 221-236, 545-51, 556-63.)  The juries convicted Davis of failure to 
notify of change of address of sex offender registration in one case (R., p. 267), 
and in the other convicted Davis of two counts of lewd conduct (acquitting him on 
two others); two counts of sexual battery of a minor (acquitting him on another); 
and one count of possession of sexually exploitative materials (acquitting him on 
three others) (R., pp. 602-051).  The enhancements in both cases were submitted 
to the court, which found Davis guilty.  (R., pp. 289-90, 563, 607.) 
                                            
1 Three of the remaining counts were dismissed on motion of the prosecutor and 
one was dismissed on motion of the defense.  (R., p. 561.) 
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 The district court imposed (1) consecutive sentences of 35 years with 15 
years determinate on the lewd conduct and sexual battery convictions and 15 
years determinate for the possession of sexually exploitative material conviction 
and (2) a concurrent sentence of 45 years with 20 years determinate for the sex 
offender registration conviction.  (R., pp. 291-92, 628-29.)  Davis filed a notice of 
appeal timely from the entry of the judgments in both cases.  (R., pp. 738-41.) 
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ISSUES 
 
 Davis states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court commit reversible error when it denied 
Mr. Davis’ motion for a mistrial in the sexual conduct case? 
 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a 
unified sentence of forty-five years, with twenty years fixed, 
upon Mr. Davis following his conviction for failure to notify of 
change of address for sexual offender registration? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 12.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Davis failed to demonstrate that the district court erred when it denied 
his motion for a mistrial? 
 
2. Has Davis failed to demonstrate an abuse of sentencing discretion in 
sentencing him for his sex offender registry violation? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
Davis Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred When It Denied 
His Motion For A Mistrial 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 During Davis’s trial for numerous counts of sexual misconduct, the 
prosecutor asked victim Z.B. about an interview by the police who were 
investigating Davis.  (Tr., p. 666, Ls. 6-19.)  The prosecutor asked about the 
“context” of the police interview and, when asked to clarify the question, asked, 
“[W]hat did they want to talk to you about Jake [Davis] about?”  (Tr., p. 666, 
Ls. 20-23.)  Z.B. answered, “About registered sex offender.”  (Tr., p. 666, L. 24.)   
 The defense objected, the court held a sidebar, and then dismissed the 
jury for a morning break.  (Tr., p. 666, L. 25 – p. 667, L. 8.)  In the jury’s absence 
the court reporter read the prior testimony and the defense moved for a mistrial.  
(Tr., p. 667, Ls. 9-19.)  The state opposed the motion.  (Tr., p. 667, L. 20 – 
p. 668, L. 11.)  The court did not grant the motion “at this time,” but took the 
matter under advisement and gave the defense the opportunity to request a 
curative instruction.  (Tr., p. 668, Ls. 12-16.)  When the district court revisited the 
issue, it confirmed its denial of the motion for mistrial and the defense declined 
the court’s invitation to give a curative instruction.  (Tr., p. 921, L. 6 – p. 922, 
L. 3.)   
 On appeal Davis contends the district court erred by denying the mistrial.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-19.)  Although the state does not contend (and never 
has) that the witness’s statement that the police interviewed him “[a]bout 
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registered sex offender” was admissible, Davis has failed to show that the 
statement deprived him of a fair trial.2  Davis has therefore failed to show that the 
district court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “The trial judge’s refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that 
incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error.”  State v. Field, 
144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007) (internal quotations and citations 
and brackets omitted).  The appellant “has the burden of showing that the trial 
court’s refusal to declare a mistrial constituted reversible error.”  State v. Hedger, 
115 Idaho 598, 601, 768 P.2d 1331, 1334 (1989).  
 
C. The Trial Court’s Denial Of A Mistrial Did Not Constitute Reversible Error 
 
 “A mistrial may be declared, upon the defendant’s motion, if there has 
been an error or legal defect during the trial which is prejudicial to the defendant 
and deprives the defendant of a fair trial.”  State v. Dopp, 129 Idaho 597, 603, 
                                            
2 Davis spends a great deal of his brief trying to establish that the statement 
represents “prosecutorial misconduct.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-16.)  To the 
extent Davis insinuates that the prosecutor deliberately elicited evidence the 
district court had previously found inadmissible, the state strongly denies any 
such insinuation, and such an insinuation is unsupported by the record.  
Moreover, “the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the 
prosecutor.”  Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982).  The mistrial standard 
would be the same even if the witness had volunteered the information during 
defense questioning.  See Hedger, 115 Idaho at 601, 768 P.2d at 1334 
(addressing mistrial where “improper testimony inadvertently arises”); State v. 
Boothe, 103 Idaho 187, 192, 646 P.2d 429, 434 (Ct. App. 1982) (witness 
volunteered statement about polygraphs during defense questioning). 
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930 P.2d 1039, 1045 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing I.C.R. 29.1).  “The core inquiry” 
when denial of a mistrial is challenged on appeal is “whether it appears from the 
record that the event triggering the mistrial motion contributed to the verdict, 
leaving the appellate court with a reasonable doubt that the jury would have 
reached the same result had the event not occurred.”  State v. Palin, 106 Idaho 
70, 75, 675 P.2d 49, 54 (Ct. App. 1983).  The issue, where a defendant 
challenges the denial of his motion for mistrial where inadmissible or prejudicial 
testimony has been presented, is whether the testimony “was so inherently 
prejudicial that no instruction from the district judge that the testimony be stricken 
and disregarded by the jury could have been strong enough to overcome the 
prejudice created.”  State v. Wilbanks, 95 Idaho 346, 354, 509 P.2d 331, 339 
(1973).   
 Here there is no dispute that the statement that police investigating Davis 
interviewed Z.B. “[a]bout registered sex offender” was inadmissible and 
potentially prejudicial to Davis.  However, viewed retrospectively, Davis has failed 
to establish that denial of the mistrial motion was reversible error because the 
statement was not so prejudicial that no instruction could have overcome the 
prejudice. 
 Perhaps the strongest indicator that the verdicts were not the product of 
prejudice, but instead a considered application of the instructions to the 
evidence, is the fact that the jury ultimately convicted  Davis on five counts while 
it acquitted him on six.  (R., pp. 602-05.)  The district court found as much in 
sentencing: 
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[W]e had a trial that actually started out with somewhere around 11 
or 12, I think by the time it went to the jury, 12 counts. And that jury 
obviously listened to the trial testimony and looked at the Court’s 
instructions, because they didn’t just say, you know what, we think 
he is guilty of one count, so we are going to find him guilty of 
everything. They didn’t. They found you guilty of Count 2, lewd and 
lascivious, with the victim being [T.B.]; Count 4, lewd and 
lascivious, with the victim being [T.B.]; Count 7, sexual battery, the 
victim, [Z.B.]; Count 8, sexual battery with the victim, [Z.B.]; and 
Count 12, possession of sexually exploitative material. 
 
They considered, in my view carefully, whether the State had 
presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, and they 
came up with those five counts. 
 
(Sentencing Tr., p. 37, L. 20 – p. 38, L. 11.)  The district court’s finding that the 
jury had carefully considered the evidence and concluded Davis’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt on the five convictions is unrebutted. 
 Davis first attempts to flip his appellate burden to the state.  (Appellant’s 
brief, p. 16.)  As set forth above, however, it is the appellant who “has the burden 
of showing that the trial court’s refusal to declare a mistrial constituted reversible 
error.”  State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 601, 768 P.2d 1331, 1334 (1989).  As 
authority for his contention that the state, as respondent, must affirmatively show 
the district court made the correct ruling, Davis cites State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).  (Appellant’s brief, p. 16.)  The Perry case, 
however, did not address denial of a mistrial motion, and therefore did not 
overrule precedent of the Idaho Supreme Court holding that it is the appellant’s 
burden of showing the denial of a motion for mistrial was error.  Moreover, the 
Perry analysis is entirely consistent with the appellant having the burden of 
showing error in the denial of a mistrial motion. 
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According to Perry, “Where the defendant meets his initial burden of 
showing that a violation occurred, the State then has the burden of 
demonstrating to the appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
constitutional violation did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.”  150 Idaho at 227, 
245 P.3d at 979 (emphasis added).  Before the state has the burden of showing 
an error harmless, the appellant has the burden of showing error.  When 
challenging the denial of a motion for mistrial, the error that appellant must show 
is that the trial court erred in concluding that the presentation of inadmissible or 
prejudicial evidence did not “depriv[e] the defendant of a fair trial.”  I.C.R. 29.1; 
see also Field, 144 Idaho at 571, 165 P.3d at 285; Hedger, 115 Idaho at 601, 
768 P.2d at 1334.  Merely showing that an event triggered a motion for a mistrial 
does not establish error by the trial court.  Because the district court erroneously 
denied the mistrial motion only if Z.B.’s statement deprived Davis of a fair trial, 
and Davis has the burden of showing error, it is Davis’s burden on appeal to 
show that he was denied a fair trial. 
Davis has not met his burden.  He first argues that evidence tending to 
show he was a registered sex offender is unduly prejudicial and inadmissible.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-17.)  The state does not dispute either claim.  However, 
Davis’s burden is not to merely show that inadmissible or even prejudicial 
evidence was placed before the jury; it is to show that the district court erred 
when it concluded such did not render his trial unfair.  I.C.R. 29.1.  A trial is not 
rendered unfair by presentation of inadmissible evidence if an instruction could 
cure the prejudice.  Wilbanks, 95 Idaho at 354, 509 P.2d at 339.  Moreover, as 
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stated above, after the trial was completed the district court found that the jury 
carefully considered the evidence and applied the law to it.  The record does not 
support the conclusion that the jury acted out of prejudice instead of following its 
instructions and considering the evidence. 
Davis also argues that the statement did not refer to “sex offender 
registration in a generic sense” and asserts the “jury was therefore likely to infer 
that Mr. Davis was a registered sex offender.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-18.)  
Although, again, the testimony was inadmissible, it was not nearly as prejudicial 
as Davis asserts.  It did not render the trial unfair. 
The statement was that the police, in their investigation of Davis, 
interviewed Z.B. “[a]bout registered sex offender.”  (Tr., p. 666, Ls. 20-23.)  Z.B. 
did not claim that Davis was a registered sex offender, or that the police asserted 
he was a registered sex offender.  The statement is just as easily interpreted as 
the interview touching on whether Davis was a registered sex offender.  
Immediately after the break the prosecutor elicited evidence that the interview 
was about whether Davis possessed child pornography, specifically a video of 
Z.B. in a sexual situation.  (Tr., p. 670, L. 14 – p. 672, L. 11.)  That the police 
investigation of Davis included interviewing Z.B. “[a]bout registered sex offender” 
(emphasis added) did not establish that Davis was a registered sex offender any 
more than evidence the police interviewed Z.B. about child pornography 
established that Davis was in possession of child pornography.  Indeed, that the 
police were investigating Davis “about registered sex offender” but he was not 
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charged with a sex offender registry offense in this case may have led the jury to 
conclude that the police investigation cleared Davis.     
The statement was far less prejudicial than Davis asserts, because it did 
not establish that Davis was a registered sex offender, only that he was being 
investigated about such.  The district court found that the jury carefully reviewed 
the evidence and applied its instructions, a finding supported by the record.  
Davis has failed to establish that the single inadmissible statement by Z.B. that 
the police investigating Davis interviewed him “[a]bout registered sex offender” 
deprived him of a fair trial. 
 
II. 
Davis Has Failed To Demonstrate An Abuse Of Sentencing Discretion In 
Sentencing Him For His Sex Offender Registry Violation 
 
 Davis does not challenge his sentences for lewd conduct, sexual battery 
or possession of sexually exploitative materials.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 19-22.)  
He does, however, challenge the sentence for his sex offender registry offense.  
(Id.)  Specifically, he argues that the district court erred by considering factors 
“based on the improper convictions from the sexual abuse case.”  (Id. at p. 21.)  
This argument is without merit. 
 First, Davis has cited no authority for his argument that it is improper to 
consider the lewd conduct, sexual battery and child pornography convictions.  
“When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or 
argument, they will not be considered.”  State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 
923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996).  Davis’s failure to support his argument with authority 
is fatal. 
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 Second, the law is directly contrary to Davis’s claim.  A sentencing court 
“may consider hearsay evidence, evidence of previously dismissed charges 
against the defendant, or evidence of charges which have not yet been proved, 
so long as the defendant has the opportunity to object to, or to rebut, the 
evidence of his alleged misconduct.”  State v. Campbell, 123 Idaho 922, 926, 
854 P.2d 265, 269 (Ct. App. 1993).  A conviction was not a prerequisite for the 
court’s consideration of Davis’s sexual misconduct. 
 Because Davis has not supported his argument with any legal authority, 
and because the applicable legal authority says the opposite of his argument, 
Davis has failed to show any abuse of discretion. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgments of the 
district court. 
 DATED this 2nd day of February, 2017. 
 
 
      __/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 2nd day of February, 2017, served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an 
electronic copy to: 
 
 BEN P. McGREEVY 
 DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us. 
 
 
 
      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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